

Discussion of
"Quantitative Analysis of a Wealth Tax in the
United States: Exclusions, Evasion, and
Expenditures"

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The paper: a pragmatic approach to wealth tax

- Very interesting paper on the topical issue. Impressive model!
- **The issue:** wealth tax is heavily discussed but existing papers do not allow for exclusion of housing and privately-held businesses. These exclusions likely to be present in practice.
- **The question:** What are the macroeconomic and budgetary implications of providing exclusions for owner-occupied housing and noncorporate business equity from a stylized top-wealth tax?
- **The method:** MP write down a two-sector, large-scale overlapping generations model calibrated to the United States. Key features:
 - Households choose wealth composition: financial vs. housing assets.
 - Two-sector production to capture endogenous tax avoidance.

The findings

1. **Main experiment:** 1% tax on all household wealth exceeding the top 1% individual-level threshold, revenues generated by the policy used to pay down federal debt.
 - Increases federal tax revenue by 6.9% and 3.7% in the first and thirtieth years (decrease of debt of 31.8 points of GDP).
2. **Alternative 1:** exclusion of owner-occupied housing
 - No quantitatively meaningful macroeconomic and budgetary impact.
3. **Alternative 2:** exclusion of noncorporate business equity
 - Reallocation of 1.8 percentage of economic activity to noncorporate sector.
 - 15% reduction in revenues relative to main experiment.

Model vs. Legal Framework: who do you model?

Legal forms of business organization (LFO) in the US. Key margins:

- **Limited liability:** Corporate vs. Noncorporate
- **Taxation of profits:** Pass-through firms vs. C corporations
- **Transferring ownership:** Publicly traded vs. Privately held

The paper mixes the margins:


- **Noncorporate sector:** taxed like pass-through with limited liability and publicly traded via intermediary.
- **Corporate sector:** taxed like C corporations, otherwise the same.

Seems like key margin in the model is taxation, but:

- Non-corporate are **not** privately held and can be valued for tax purposes.
- There is **selection** into the LFOs in the data.

Selection: who is who in the data?

Figure: Conditional Probability of observing the pass-through - empirical distribution (left panel), logit regression (right panel)



Source: [Dyrda, Pugsley \(2021\)](#). Notes: SCF waves 2004-2016, the variables are deviations from annual average

- Wealthier business owners run **also C corps**. More profitable businesses are often C corps.
- Potential wealth tax would be levied on them, but this **heterogeneity is absent** in the model.

Further comments

1. **Financial vs. housing assets**: can be adjusted freely in response to change in fundamentals. In practice housing is **illiquid**.
2. **Policy invariant** margins:
 - Debt-to-capital ratio
 - Dividend payout ratio

Are there empirical evidence to support these assumptions?

3. There is no risk in the model. Thus, no **equity risk premium**, counter to the existing evidence.
 - The only wedge between safe rate of return and returns on equity is due to tax differentials.