
Living Arrangements and Labor Market Volatility of Young Workers

Sebastian Dyrda Greg Kaplan José-Víctor Ríos-Rull


CERGE, Prague, December 9 2016

Hours fluctuations for young people




- Young people (18-30) larger cyclical volatility in "normal" cycles
- Harder hit during Great Recession

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
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Living arrangements matter more than age




- Roughly half of 18-30 live with a 31-65 (home), half don't (away)
- Young people away: higher average hours, lower volatility
- Additional volatility for young concentrated among young at home

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Living arrangements: endogenous, countercylical



- Increased by >5pp during Great Recession, barely fallen
- Counter-cyclical in previous cycles
- More general: hours per hh 20% less volatile than hours per person

- 1. Quantitative theory of fluctuations in living arrangements and hours worked for young relative to old
 - Co-residence trade-off: implicit transfers vs disutility
 - Labor supply more responsive to wages: wedge between Marshallian elasticity of young living away vs together

- 1. Quantitative theory of fluctuations in living arrangements and hours worked for young relative to old
- 2. Estimate model with aggregate data
 - Relative hours, wages by age and coresidence
 - Dynamics of living arrangements
 - De-trended from 1978 to 2006
 - Key identifying assumptions:
 - a. Selection: functional forms for dist of unobservables
 - b. Labor supply vs demand: conditional on skills, living arrangements do not affect productivity

- 1. Quantitative theory of fluctuations in living arrangements and hours worked for young relative to old
- 2. Estimate model with aggregate data
- 3. Use estimated model as measurement device
 - a. Size of implicit transfers? 17% of consumption of old
 - b. Difference in Marshallian elasticity by living arrangements? 60% higher for young living with old
 - c. Importance of coresidence for hours of young?
 - Possibility of in coresidence: 37% of variance
 - Endogeneity in coresidence: 6% of variance
 - d. Labor supply vs demand for hours volatility of young?
 - e. Implications for Frisch elasticity in RA models? 85% larger

- 1. Quantitative theory of fluctuations in living arrangements and hours worked for young relative to old
- 2. Estimate model with aggregate data
- 3. Use estimated model as measurement device
- 4. Interpret Great Recession experience of young relative to old
 - Given dynamics for hours of old, were hours, wages and living arrangements of young in line with expectations based on previous recessions?
 - Additional relative shift in either labor demand or labor supply?

Logic: implicit transfers affect labor supply


- Living arrangements matter because implicit transfers affect the Marshallian labor supply elasticity
- Young have low wealth: Marshallian more relevant than Frisch
- So young should be less volatile than old ...
 ...but implicit transfers and lower expenses when living with old
 lead to higher effective labor supply elasticity
- When labor market opportunities worsen, young people:
 - Living with parents: might as well sit on parents couch
 - Living independently: either keep working to pay the bills, like the old guys, or move in with an old guy and sit on their couch

Evidence

Data: 1978-2015

- CPS Basic Monthly Surveys for hours (monthly)
- CPS ASEC for wages (annual)
- Individuals: 18-65 year olds, not in school, not in group quarters
- Households: households with at least one such person
- Household size: number of 18-65 year olds not in school
- Quarterly series: de-seasonalize using X12-ARIMA from BLS
- Detrending:
 - 1978-2006: Hodrick-Prescott and various other filters,
 - 2007-2010: Great Recession
 - 2011-2015: Great Recession recovery

Hours at the household level



- Household size moves a lot: trend and cyclical
- Hours per person more volatile than hours per household

Useful decomposition

- H = total hours
- N = number of individuals
- F = number of households

$$\underbrace{\frac{H}{N}}_{\text{hours per person}} = \underbrace{\frac{H}{F}}_{\text{household}} \div \underbrace{\frac{N}{F}}_{\text{persons per household}}$$

• Cyclical fluctuations

$$V\left(\log \frac{H}{N}\right) = \underbrace{V\left(\log \frac{H}{F}\right)}_{\text{hrs per hh}} + \underbrace{V\left(\log \frac{F}{N}\right)}_{\text{hh size}} - \underbrace{2COV\left(\log \frac{H}{F}, \log \frac{F}{N}\right)}_{\text{covariance term}}$$

Useful decomposition 1

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	Cyclical Variance, 78-06		Great Recession Change, 07-10		
	Quarterly	Annual	Quarterly	Annual	
hrs per hh	85%	92%	84%	85%	
hh size	5%	3%	16%	15%	
covariance	10%	5%			

• Changes in household size offset around 8%-15% of changes in hours per person, at the household level

Definitions:

• Population: 18-65 yr olds not in school

• Young: 18-30

• Old: 31-65

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Quarterly moments relative to old, 1978-06:

	Young	Young Away	Young Together
Mean hours	1.00		
St dev log hours	1.58		

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- St dev log fraction young with old ≈ 0.8
- Cyclical correlation ≈ -0.6

Useful decomposition 2

- Importance of endogeneity of coresidence: counterfactual series for hours assuming constant x = fraction of young living with old
- All variation in hours is due to variation in hours of two groups:

$$M = 1 - \frac{V(\log \left[\bar{x}h^{yT} + (1 - \bar{x}h^y A)\right])}{V(\log h^y)}$$

\$\approx 5\%\$

- Living arrangements: labor supply different for young vs old
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 Annual moments relative to old, 1978-06:

	Young	Young Away	Young Together
Mean wages	0.65		
St dev log wages	1.07		

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- Technology with imperfect substitutability between old and young
- Estimate with cross-industry variation: qualitative success

- Living arrangements: labor supply different for young vs old
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- Technology with imperfect substitutability between old and young
- Estimate with cross-industry variation: qualitative success
- Problems with the labor demand story:
 - Qualitative argument fails with Frisch for old $< \infty$
 - Quantitative argument requires Frisch for young = 7, old = ∞
 - Wage volatility is basically the same for young at home and away

Annual moments relative to old, 1978-06:

	Young	Young Away	Young Together
Mean wages	0.65	0.75	0.52
St dev log wages	1.07	1.18	1.11

• Imperfect substitutability by living arrangements implausible

Model

Demographics

Old agents

- Identical
- Live in unitary households
- Can be invaded by a young agent

Young agents

- Two independent idiosyncratic shocks
 - Individual productivity ε
 - Distaste for living with old agents η
- Can invade an old households

At any point in time there are three types of agents:

- 1. Old: μ
- 2. Young alone: $(1 \mu)(1 x)$
- 3. Young together (with old): $(1 \mu) x$

Old agents

• Standard RA intertemporal problem

$$V^{o}(a; w^{o}, r) = \max_{c,h,a'} u^{o}(c, h) + \beta E V^{o}(a'; w^{o'}, r')$$

s.t. $c + a' = w^{o}h + (1 + r)a$

• Standard preferences

$$u^{o}(c, h) = \log c - \psi^{o} \frac{h^{1 + \frac{1}{\nu^{o}}}}{1 + \frac{1}{\nu^{o}}}$$

• Aggregate uncertainty: w^o , r

Young agents

• Young are hand-to-mouth

$$V^{y}\left(\varepsilon, \eta; w^{y}, c^{o}\right) = \max_{A} \left\{ V^{A}\left(\varepsilon; w^{y}\right), V^{T}\left(\varepsilon, \eta; w^{y}, c^{o}\right) \right\}$$

• Young alone

$$V^{A}\left(\boldsymbol{\varepsilon}; w^{y}\right) = \max_{c,h} \frac{c^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} - \psi^{y} \frac{h^{1+\frac{1}{\nu^{y}}}}{1+\frac{1}{\nu^{y}}}$$

s.t.
$$c = w^{y} \boldsymbol{\varepsilon} h$$

• Young together

$$V^{T}(\boldsymbol{\varepsilon}, \boldsymbol{\eta}; w^{y}, c^{o}) = \max_{c,h} \frac{\left[c + \zeta(c^{o})\right]^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} - \psi^{y} \frac{h^{1+\frac{1}{\nu^{y}}}}{1+\frac{1}{\nu^{y}}} - \boldsymbol{\eta}$$
s.t. $c = w^{y} \boldsymbol{\varepsilon} h$

- Require $\gamma < 1$ for positive co-movement of wages and hours
- Implicit transfers from old (economies of scale): $\zeta\left(c_{o}\right)$


Technology

• Nested CES with capital-experience complementarity (Jaimovich-Pruitt-Siu, AER 2013)

$$F(K, N^{y}, N^{o}; Z) = \left[\alpha \left(ZN^{y}\right)^{\sigma} + (1 - \alpha)\left(\lambda K^{\rho} + (1 - \lambda)\left(ZN^{o}\right)^{\rho}\right)^{\frac{\sigma}{\rho}}\right]^{\frac{1}{\sigma}}$$
 where N^{y} and N^{o} are labor inputs of young and old

- Technology generates higher hours and wage volatility for young
- Technology depends on age, but not living arrangements
- Structure on top of standard RBC model: shocks to Z

Living arrangements for young



Recursive Competitive Equilibrium

- Aggregate state of economy $s \equiv (K, Z)$
- An equilibrium is a set functions
 - consumption $\{c^{yA}(\varepsilon, s), c^{yT}(\varepsilon, \eta, s), c^{o}(s)\}$
 - hours worked $\{h^{yA}(\varepsilon, s), h^{yT}(\varepsilon, \eta, s), h^{o}(s)\}$
 - threshold for staying at home $\eta^*(s, \varepsilon)$
 - fraction of young that move in with the old x(s)

such that:

- old maximize given prices
- young maximize given prices and choice of old
- factor markets clear
- fraction of young living with old satisfies

$$x(s) = \int_0^\infty \int_{-\infty}^{\eta^*(s,\varepsilon)} dF_{\eta} dF_{\varepsilon}$$

where $\eta^*(s,\varepsilon)$ satisfies the indifference condition for all ε .

Parameterization

Parameterization strategy

Two sets of parameters from outside model:

- 1. Production function elasticities: Jaimovich-Pruitt-Siu (2013)
- 2. Frisch elasticity of old: baseline = 0.72 Heathcote-Storesletten-Violante (2014)

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Estimate remaining parameters using cyclical fluctuations, 1978-06

- 1. Standard aggregates (r, I/Y, Capital Share, Solow residual)
- 2. Mean hours of old, young alone, young together
- 3. Mean wages of young alone, young together

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Estimate remaining parameters using cyclical fluctuations, 1978-06

- 1. Standard aggregates (r, I/Y, Capital Share, Solow residual)
- 2. Mean hours of old, young alone, young together
- 3. Mean wages of young alone, young together
- 4. St dev hrs of young along, young together relative to st dev hrs old
- 5. Mean fraction of young living with old
- 6. St dev fraction of young living with old relative to st dev hrs old
- 7. Correlation between fraction of young living with old and hours

Intuition for identification

Functional form assumptions

- Productivity heterogeneity: $\varepsilon \sim \log N$
- Disutility heterogeneity: $\eta \sim N$
- Implicit transfer function: $\zeta(c^o) = \zeta_0 + \zeta_1 c^o$

10 parameters, 10 moments:

- Labor disutility old ψ^o : $E[h^o]$
- Labor disutility young ψ^y : $\frac{E[h^y]}{E[h^o]}$
- Productivity dist $\varepsilon: \frac{E[w^y]}{E[w^o]}, \frac{E[w^{yA}]}{E[w^{yT}]}$
- Young preferences γ , ν^y : $\frac{\sigma[h^y]}{\sigma[h^o]}$, $\frac{\sigma[h^y^A]}{\sigma[h^y^T]}$
- Implicit transfers ζ_0 , ζ_1 : $\frac{E[h^{yA}]}{E[h^{yT}]}$, $\rho(h, x)$
- Disutility dist η : E[x], $\frac{\sigma[x]}{\sigma[h^o]}$

Model fit

	Data	Model
Relative hours		
$E[h^y]/E[h^o]$	1.00	1.01
$E[h^{yA}]/E[h^{yT}]$	1.24	1.34
$\sigma[h^y]/\sigma[h^o]$	1.67	1.65
$\sigma[h^{yA}]/\sigma[h^{yT}]$	0.68	0.72
Relative wages		
$E[w^y]/E[w^o]$	0.65	0.64
$E[w^{yA}]/E[w^{yT}]$	1.44	1.36
$\sigma[w^y]/\sigma[w^o]$	1.07	1.10
$\sigma[w^{yA}]/\sigma[w^{yT}]$	1.06	1.04
Living arrangements		
$\sigma[x]/\sigma[h^o]$	0.75	0.78
corr(x, h)	-0.56	-0.56
M	0.05	0.04
Contr F/N	0.15	0.16

Lessons

Size of implicit transfers

$$\zeta(c^o) = \zeta_0 + \zeta_1 c^o$$

1. Average fraction of consumption of old

$$E\left[\frac{\zeta(c^o)}{c^o}\right] = 17\%$$

2. Average fraction of consumption of young together

$$E\left[\frac{\zeta(c^o)}{\zeta(c^o) + c^{yT}}\right] = 50\%$$

3. Average additional hours need to work by young together

$$E\left[\frac{\hat{h}^{yT} - h^{yT}}{h^{yT}}\right] = 37\%$$

Why does coresidence affect hours?

- Frisch elasticity for old = 0.72
- Marshallian elasticity for young alone

$$e^{yA} = \frac{(1-\gamma)\nu^y}{1+\gamma\nu^y}$$

• Marshallian elasticity for young together

$$e^{yT}(\varepsilon) = e^{yA} \times \frac{1 + \frac{1}{1-\gamma} \frac{\zeta(\varepsilon^0)}{c^{yT}(\varepsilon)}}{1 + \frac{1}{1+\gamma \nu^y} \frac{\zeta(\varepsilon^0)}{c^{yT}(\varepsilon)}}$$

- If $\gamma < 1$, $\zeta > 0$ then $e^{yT}(\varepsilon) > e^{yA}$
- If $\zeta = 0$ then $e^{yT}(\varepsilon) = e^{yA}$. Also e^{yT} increasing in ζ

Why does coresidence affect hours?

- Frisch elasticity for old = 0.72
- Marshallian elasticity for young alone

$$e^{yA} = 0.45$$

• Marshallian elasticity for young together

$$E\left[e^{yT}\right] = 0.73$$

- If $\gamma < 1$, $\zeta > 0$ then $e^{yT}(\varepsilon) > e^{yA}$
- If $\zeta = 0$ then $e^{yT}(\varepsilon) = e^{yA}$. Also e^{yT} increasing in ζ

Importance of coresidence for hours volatility

Experiment 1:

- Possibility of coresidence, no endogeneity of coresidence
- $x = \bar{x}$: fix thresholds $\eta^*(\varepsilon, s) = \eta^*(\varepsilon, \bar{s})$
- St dev of log total hours: 5.5% lower
- St dev of log of young: 6.4% lower

Experiment 2:

- No possibility of coresidence
- x = 0: all young live alone
- St dev of log total hours: 31.4% lower
- St dev of log of young: 37.2% lower

Demand vs. supply channel

	Data	RBC	RBC	Baseline
		+ Imp. Subst.	+ Liv. Arr.	Model
Relative hours				
$E[h^y]/E[h^o]$	1.00	1.01	0.99	1.01
$E[h^{yA}]/E[h^{yT}]$	1.24	-	1.32	1.34
$\sigma[h^y]/\sigma[h^o]$	1.67	1.66	1.66	1.65
$\sigma[h^{yA}]/\sigma[h^{yT}]$	0.68	-	0.70	0.72
Relative wages				
$E[w^y]/E[w^o]$	0.65	0.87	0.66	0.64
$E[w^{yA}]/E[w^{yT}]$	1.44	-	1.37	1.36
$\sigma[w^y]/\sigma[w^o]$	1.07	1.32	1.00	1.10
$\sigma[w^{yA}]/\sigma[w^{yT}]$	1.06	-	1.00	1.04
Living arrangements				
$\sigma[x]/\sigma[h^o]$	0.75	-	0.77	0.78
corr(x, h)	-0.56	-	-0.56	-0.56
M	0.05	_	0.06	0.04

Implications for RA Frisch elasticity

- RA models: Frisch elasticity key for volatility of aggregate hours


 → useful metric for measuring strength of other channels
- What Frisch elasticity would RA model require to generate same volatility of hours as model with young people and coresidence?


Frisch elasticity	Implied Frisch	Proportional	
for old (ν^o)	in RA RBC model	Increase	
0.72	1.33	85%	
0.5	0.87	75%	
1.0	2.15	115%	
2.0	9.62	381%	


Great Recession


The experiment

- Look through the lens of the model at the relative (to the hours of the old) volatility of hours of young and living arrangements during the Great Recession.
- Back out the values of the shock, so that once plugged into the model it matches the mean hours worked between q1:2007 and q4:2015.
- Simulate the model forward with the implied shock values. Agents still have rational expectations about the shock realizations.









Conclusions

- Young and old have different labor market behaviors.
- We have documented the central role of the living arrangement in shaping the behavior of the young.
- We have also documented the cyclical movements of the living arrangements.
- We have provided a theory of how it works and mapped it to the data. This theory accounts for the average and cyclical behavior of the young and the old.
- As a bonus we have provided a logical theory of the differences between the micro and the macro (which is 85% larger) Frisch elasticities.